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The ACTA Boondoggle:  
When IP Harmonization Bites Off  
More Than It Can Chew 
DANIEL LIFSCHITZ∗ 
Trade agreements are not terribly useful if other countries don't sign 
them. I can write up the "Harold Feld Trade Agreement" that says I 
am entitled to duty free liquor whenever I travel, but if no one signs 
it I'm still gonna pay VAT when I do the Whisky Trail. So when 
USTR and the other trade associations involved in negotiating 
ACTA let Hollywood drive the crazy train, and the rest of the world 
decides they don't like the crazy stuff, you don't have a trade 
agreement, you have a train wreck.1 
Harold Feld 
Legal Director, Public Knowledge 
 
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is an effort 
spearheaded by the United States and other developed nations to 
strengthen international protection of intellectual property (IP) rights, 
intended to supplement existing treaties such as the Berne Convention, 
the Paris Convention, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).2 ACTA members and supporters 
have promoted it as a multilateral treaty or agreement, though this claim 
                                                            
∗ J.D., Loyola Law School, 2012; B.A., Washington & Jefferson College, 2009. The author 
would like to thank Professor Karl Manheim for his assistance in formulating this note, Professor 
Jay Dougherty for stoking the author's interest in international intellectual property law, and the 
dedicated staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review for their 
tireless efforts and helpful feedback during the editing process.  
 1. Harold Feld, ACTA:  If You Write a Trade Agreement No One Will Sign, What's the 
Point?, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/acta-if-you-
write-trade-agreement-no-one-will. 
 2. SHAYERAH ILIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41107, THE PROPOSED ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 1 (Mar. 12, 2010), 
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41107_20100312.pdf. 
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has been subject to debate.3 The drafters of ACTA claim the agreement 
is critical both to “harmonize” national IP laws and to bridge the gap 
between current and necessary standards of international IP protection: 
[T]he proliferation of counterfeit and pirated goods as well as the 
proliferation of services that distribute infringing material, 
undermines legitimate trade and the sustainable development of the 
world economy, causes significant financial losses for right holders 
and for legitimate businesses, and in some cases, provides a source 
of revenue for organized crime and otherwise poses risks to the 
public.4 
With this in mind, ACTA seeks to “provide effective and 
appropriate means, complementing the TRIPS Agreement, for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”5 The exact nature of those 
means fluctuated from draft to draft,6 but the finalized version is to be 
overseen by the “ACTA Committee,” a new international body created 
solely to enforce the agreement.7 The new body is independent of 
existing institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the United 
Nations.8 This article explores whether ACTA’s particular brand of IP 
“harmonization” is necessary (or even desirable) and, if so, whether 
upending existing legal regimes is the best way to accomplish it, in light 
of its recent public vilification. 
Due to the combination of ACTA’s protectionist measures (which 
the preamble of the agreement tacitly admits will go beyond the 
                                                            
 3. Supporters of ACTA have claimed it requires no legislative referendum and may be 
adopted through the powers of the executive branch. See Andrew Moshirnia, Let’s Make A Deal! 
Will ACTA Force an End to Executive Agreements?, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Feb. 9. 
2010), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2010/lets-make-deal-will-acta-force-end-
executive-agreements. Detractors, meanwhile, have noted that since it deals with intellectual 
property law [which, in the United States, is supposed to be within the exclusive control of the 
legislature], it must be a treaty, or it is otherwise unconstitutional. See Letter from Brook Baker et 
al., 75 Law Professors, to Pres. Barack Obama (Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter PIJIP Letter], 
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/academic-sign-on-letter-to-obama-
on-acta. For the purposes of this article, whenever the term “treaty” or “agreement” is used to 
describe ACTA, it is done without regard for the substantive constitutional ramifications of each 
classification. 
        4. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (May 2011 Draft) Preamble E-1 [hereinafter 
ACTA (May 2011 Draft)], available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Rashmi Rangnath, USTR Releases Finalized ACTA Text: Concerns Remain, PUB. 
KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 15, 2010, 10:41 PM), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/ustr-releases-
finalized-acta-text-concerns-re. 
 7. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, art. 36. 
 8. Id. ch. V, arts. 36–38. 
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requirements of TRIPS),9 its forum-avoidant negotiations, and its 
establishment of the ACTA Committee, ACTA has been criticized as 
being part of what some have termed the “global IP ratchet”—a 
concerted, long-term effort by IP maximalists to leverage increased 
protectionism through successive rounds of strong-armed international 
policy making and forum-shifting.10 The ratchet theory traces back to 
the 1980’s, when the United States shifted the subject of IP protection 
from WIPO (a trade-neutral forum where it lacked leverage) to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (a trade-focused 
forum where it had leverage) in order to increase the amount of 
protection it could procure from developing countries participating in 
the relevant negotiations.11 Since then,  
[t]hose who seek to ration access to IP [have been] engaged in an 
elaborate cat and mouse game with those who seek to expand access. 
As soon as one venue becomes less responsive to a high protectionist 
agenda, IP protectionists shift to another in search of a more 
hospitable venue.12  
While the ratchet theory provides an interesting (if unscrupulous) 
model for understanding the recent efforts of IP maximalists on the 
global stage, it also creates fertile ground to examine the collateral 
damage caused by their tactics—specifically, the delegitimizing of 
“harmonization” as both a balanced and politically viable legal 
construct going forward.  
By attempting to use harmonization as a blunt instrument to beat 
heightened and often inapposite IP standards into legal regimes without 
overt legislative approval or meaningful public input, ACTA diminishes 
respect for both intellectual property law and for international 
harmonization efforts in general. This long-term sacrifice for attempted 
short-term gain (ratcheting up IP protection another notch) contravenes 
the core purpose of harmonization, which is to bring nations to 
meaningful consensus on issues of international importance,13 and 
reveals the true intent of ACTA:  to forge protectionist policies amongst 
                                                            
 9. Id. pmbl. (“Intending to provide effective and appropriate means, complementing the 
TRIPS Agreement, for the enforcement of intellectual property rights . . .”) [emphasis in 
original]. 
  10. See generally, Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and 
Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play, 1 IQSENSATO OCCASIONAL PAPERS (2008), 
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=
research.  
  11. Id. at 4.  
 12. Id. at 5. 
 13. The Wittem Project: European Copyright Code, WITTEM GROUP (Apr. 2010), 
http://www.copyrightcode.eu/Wittem_European_copyright_code_21%20april%202010.pdf.  
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a “select group of like-minded countries,”14 then foist them on “third-
nations such as China, Russia, and Brazil”15 that developed nations 
perceive to have unreasonably lax standards of IP protection. Unless 
civil states and citizens’ groups stand up to oppose this conflation of 
methods and goals, “harmonization” will become synonymous with 
“backroom deal,” and it will prove increasingly difficult to utilize any 
balanced form of the construct without immediate skepticism and 
distrust from both foreign governments and the public at large. 
This article’s purpose is to examine the history and goals of ACTA 
in order to understand both how and why it abuses the harmonization 
construct. Part I will briefly discuss the modern history of IP 
harmonization leading up to the conception of ACTA. Part II will detail 
the basic content and secretive drafting of ACTA, contrasting both to 
the ideals of harmonization. Part III will step back to examine the 
rhetoric surrounding protection of IP to better understand how ACTA’s 
namesake is not congruent with its provisions. Part IV will examine 
ACTA’s potential to prematurely lock in developing areas of IP law as 
an example of harmonization abuse. Part V will examine the problems 
that have arisen in the negotiation rounds to further demonstrate 
ACTA’s disinterest in meaningful harmonization. Part VI will examine 
the true goal of ACTA and its likelihood of successful imposition 
amongst developing countries in particular. Part VII will briefly look 
beyond ACTA to determine how similar IP-ratcheting efforts conceived 
in its wake have retroactively affected its viability. Finally, Part VIII 
will conclude by looking at the state of IP harmonization in the 
aggregate, evaluating ACTA’s place (or lack thereof) within it, and 
suggesting what should be done moving forward. 
I.  THE DELICATE ISSUE OF IP HARMONIZATION 
IP is, at its core, an artificial monopoly on certain goods in the 
marketplace, granted to rights owners by governments.16 How a 
                                                            
 14. Viewing Cable 06TOKYO3567, Japan Backs Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
Proposal, WIKILEAKS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06TOKYO3567.html 
[hereinafter Tokyo Cable 1] (June 28, 2006 diplomatic cable VZCZCXRO2649 from the 
American Embassy in Tokyo to Washington, D.C.). 
 15. Viewing Cable 06TOKYO4025, PM Koizumi’s Advisor Proposes Bilateral IPR Agenda, 
WIKILEAKS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/07/06TOKYO4025.html [hereinafter 
Tokyo Cable 2] (July 20, 2006 diplomatic cable VZCZCXRO5711 from the American Embassy 
in Tokyo to Washington, D.C.). 
 16. See Lucy Montgomery & Jason Potts, Global Reuse and Adaptation in the Creative 
Industries - Three Further Arguments Against Intellectual Property Based on Lessons From 
China 6, DIME Working Papers on Intellectual Property Rights, DIME Working Pack ‘The 
Rules, Norms and Standards on Knowledge Exchange,’ Working Paper No. 59, Apr. 2008, 
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government chooses to protect this property is heavily dependent on the 
relative values of its society, which explains the variety of approaches 
practiced by different countries with any given branch of IP.17 A typical 
example in the context of copyright law is the “moral rights” doctrine, 
which is addressed in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention (one of the 
first major international treaties attempting to harmonize IP laws 
between various countries).18 Under the provision, an author has the 
right “to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or 
other derogatory action in relation to his work . . . prejudicial to [his] 
honor or reputation,” even if he has divested his economic rights to said 
work.19 While both France and the United States are signatories to 
Berne, in practice, Article 6bis is largely made to conform to each 
country’s cultural values rather than the other way around.20 As such, 
France provides full protection for an author’s moral rights (in line with 
a cultural history of indelibly linking creative work to the self),21 while 
the United States allows for full divestment of such rights (in line with a 
historical view of IP as fully alienable in the same manner as traditional 
chattel).22 Though moral rights are not brought up in the text of ACTA, 
they are helpful in illustrating the substantive differences that can arise 
in the context of trying to harmonize IP laws internationally, and the 
fluidity required for those efforts to effectively conform to cultural 
contours.23  
 The international harmonization of IP laws can be traced back 
well over a century to the Paris Convention in 1883 (dealing with 
“industrial property” such as patents and trademarks),24 and the Berne 
                                                                                                                                         
available at http://www.dime-eu.org/files/active/0/WP59-IPR.pdf (describing IP as “an artificial 
monopoly to enable producers of ideas to capture monopoly rents that at least cover their fixed 
costs of production.”). 
 17. See Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 132 (2003) (discussing the impact of culture on the inculcation and 
development of copyright laws). 
 18. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Compare infra notes 21, 22. 
 21. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PRO. INTELL.] arts. L-121-1 to L-121-8 
(Fr.) available at http://www.celog.fr/cpi/lv1_tt2.htm. 
 22. Upon accession to Berne, the United States Congress claimed that its “moral rights” 
provisions were sufficiently addressed by existing domestic statutes, such as laws covering libel 
and false designation of origin. See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 9 (1988). 
 23. See generally S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988). 
 24. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, available 
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf. 
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Convention in 1886 (dealing with copyrights).25 Discussing the impact 
of the Paris Convention in particular, Cícero Gontijo has credited the 
longevity of these early treaties to the fact that they “did not try to level 
national laws,” but rather “stipulated a vast legislative freedom for each 
country and only required the equal treatment of nationals and 
foreigners (national treatment principle).”26 The administrative 
secretariats of Paris and Berne merged in 1893 to form the United 
International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, which 
relocated to Geneva in 1960 and was succeeded in 1967 by WIPO.27 
WIPO currently administers twenty-four different treaties concerning 
various IP issues.28 Though WIPO’s guiding principle is “to promote the 
protection of intellectual property throughout the world” [emphasis 
added],29 it allows individual countries to mix and match the treaties 
acceded to,30 striking a pragmatic and diplomatic balance between 
effective harmonization and respecting both the self-determination and 
cultural nuances of its various member states. 
Over the past two decades, however, WIPO has been slowly 
marginalized by developed countries dissatisfied by the deferential and 
bureaucratic nature of the WIPO process, which limited their ability to 
impose (rather than propose) strengthened IP protections.31 Those 
countries, in turn, began a forum-shifting process to move the protection 
of IP into a trade-driven context, where it would be easier to leverage 
                                                            
 25. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
     26.  Cícero Gontijo, Changing the Patent System from the Paris Convention to the TRIPS 
Agreement: The Position of Brazil GLOBAL ISSUE PAPERS NO. 26, 7 (Andrea Carina Ceschi, 
trans., Heinrich Böll Foundation, Dec. 2005), http://fdcl-
berlin.de/fileadmin/fdcl/Publikationen/GIP_Gontijo-Patente.pdf. 
     27.  See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization arts. 2–3, July 
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Convention 
Establishing WIPO], available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=130331. 
     28.  See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ (last visited July 11, 2012). 
     29.  Convention Establishing WIPO, supra note 27, art. 3(i). 
 30. Admission Criteria of WIPO, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited July 11, 2012). A country may join WIPO by 
invitation or by membership to any one of a number of organizations or conventions. 
 31. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L. L. 20 (2004) (“Two factors 
motivated the United States and the EC, in response to pressures from their respective intellectual 
property industries, to shift intellectual property lawmaking from WIPO to GATT. The first 
related to dissatisfaction with treaty negotiations hosted by WIPO. The second focused on 
institutional features of the GATT that facilitated adoption of more stringent intellectual property 
protection standards that these states favored.”). 
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higher levels of protection.32 This began with the inclusion of IP issues 
in the 1986 mandate for the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, 
leading to the creation of the WTO.33 From there, the passage of TRIPS 
in 1994 superseded a slew of WIPO treaties (many incorporated by 
mention)34 by setting minimum requirements for signatory nations’ 
domestic laws concerning copyright, trademark, and patent law—all 
congruent with harmonization efforts, but administered by the WTO 
instead of WIPO.35 All nations wishing to join the WTO were and are 
required to accede to TRIPS, with very little flexibility in the process.36 
Essentially, any WTO nation that lagged on acceding to the 
protectionist treaties of WIPO was yanked up to speed by TRIPS.37 
 The forum-shift from WIPO to the WTO is reflective of a similar 
shift in the overall tone of IP harmonization, one favoring increased 
uniformity and greater deference to industrialized countries (through 
strengthened IP protections) over cultural nuance and minimalism.38 
According to economic scholars Braithwaite and Drahos, the United 
States and other developed countries were instrumental to the lobbying 
effort that passed TRIPS, in particular by coercing less-developed 
countries under Section 301 of TRIPS.39 Section 301 authorizes the 
United States to respond to any perceived denial of rights or benefits 
                                                            
 32. Id. at 22 (“Developing nations agreed to include intellectual property within the newly 
created WTO in exchange for securing access to the markets of industrialized states for their 
agricultural products, textiles, and other goods.”). 
 33. Id. at 21. 
 34. BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 63 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) (“TRIPS incorporates various other intellectual property conventions by 
reference.”) 
 35. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 300 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 36. Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited July 11, 2012) (“All the 
WTO agreements . . . apply to all WTO members. The members each accepted all the agreements 
as a single package with a single signature—making it, in the jargon, a ‘single undertaking.’ The 
TRIPS Agreement is part of that package. Therefore it applies to all WTO members.”) 
 37. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 34, at 63 (“The post-TRIPS era has been one in 
which countries have had to engage in national implementation of their obligations under TRIPS. 
Least-developed countries have the advantage of a ten-year transitional period under the 
agreement, but they have been pressured by developed countries, particularly the US, to move 
sooner rather than later on its implementation.”). 
 38. Id. at 63 (“In the past, states have been able to steer their way through the international 
intellectual property framework by taking reservation on clauses in treaties or by not ratifying 
certain protocols or conventions. All of TRIPS is binding on all members of the WTO.”). 
 39. Id. (“Once the US had persuaded a sufficient number of countries to act on the 
intellectual property issue at a bilateral level, it could expect little resistance to the TRIPS 
proposal (in fact resistance to US negotiating objectives at a multilateral forum could and did 
trigger the 301 process).”). 
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under a trade agreement by taking action against the offending nation 
“to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, 
or practice.”40 Arguably, the WTO’s dispute resolution process has 
replaced Section 301 as the de facto response to perceived IP disrespect 
by foreign countries, but both methods retain the same overall message:  
softness on IP protection will not be taken lightly. 
Section 301(c) outlines the various sanctions at the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) disposal when dealing 
with a foreign country’s perceived prejudicing of U.S. interests,41 and 
Section 301(d)(3)(B) includes failure to protect IP rights as an example 
of the sort of unreasonable act that could provoke this retaliation.42 As 
Braithwaite and Drahos note, “[Using Section 301] proved so effective 
that disputes over intellectual property issues during the Uruguay Round 
became disputes between the intellectual property triumvirate, the US, 
Europe and Japan. By the final stages of the negotiations, developing 
countries had long given up resisting the TRIPS proposal.”43 
At this point in the negotiation process, harmonization began to 
look a lot more like coercion than cooperation. Where WIPO fostered a 
sense of deference and cultural respect between member nations, TRIPS 
took a blunter approach by essentially barring access to the WTO’s 
various international markets until a country ratcheted up its IP laws to 
acceptable levels.44 This brought Berne-resistant states such as Russia 
and China to the table,45 but undermined the efficacy of WIPO and the 
overall sense that IP rights enforcement was up for legitimate debate.46 
Furthermore, by moving it into a strictly trade-driven context, TRIPS 
began a trend of downplaying the uniquely human elements of IP while 
forging international agreements, one that has arguably had drastic 
ramifications for both current and future harmonization efforts.47 
 As a study in contrasts, it is worth mentioning two particular 
WIPO treaties passed in the immediate post-TRIPS period:  the WIPO 
                                                            
 40. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2010). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(B). 
 43. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 34, at 63. 
 44. Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, supra note 36. 
 45.  Compare Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, available 
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/berne.pdf (accession dates of states) with 
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2011) 
(China acceded to Berne two weeks before signing to TRIPS, while Russia joined Berne three 
months after adapting TRIPS). 
 46. Helfer, supra note 31, at 4–7. 
 47. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 35, § 3. 
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Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the WIPO Copyright Treaty. 
Finalized in 1996, “[t]he negotiating history of these two treaties is 
significant in that copyright owners met with organized resistance from 
copyright users”48 as enabled by the forum. The result of this clash of 
interests was, ultimately, a more balanced treaty that represented the 
rights of both owners and users.49 TRIPS, on the other hand, was drafted 
almost entirely with copyright owners’ interests in mind, leading to an 
outcry from developing nations over the narrow readings of its 
provisions on which the developed members of the WTO insisted.50 
 It is in light of this particular history of harmonization that ACTA 
must be understood. TRIPS was the developed world’s answer to the 
“failure” of WIPO to achieve a particular desired level of 
harmonization, implementing in one fell swoop what the latter did not 
achieve in decades of operating under balancing protocols that 
permitted selective adoption of treaties by members.51 The efficacy of 
this maneuver marked a fundamental shift in the tone of harmonization, 
where the end goal was no longer to balance IP for its own sake, but to 
drive it in a particular, uniform direction to service exterior concerns.52 
By using the GATT to frame IP as a trade issue, TRIPS justified 
shifting the debate from WIPO to the WTO, where developed countries 
could draft harmonization provisions with less pressure from consumer 
advocacy groups or developing nations.53 Harmonization as a trade 
method became distinct from harmonization as a legal method, and the 
WTO was almost exclusively concerned with servicing the former.54 
ACTA represents the latest iteration of this trend, having shifted 
somewhat from a trade concern to a security and infringement-based 
concern. Though its preamble does discuss some trade concerns 
outright,55 much of the language of ACTA is dressed up with security 
                                                            
 48. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 37, at 64.  
 49. Id. (“The Copyright Treaty grants copyright owners a right of communication to the 
public, but recognizes the right of states to determine the extent of the copyright owner’s right of 
distribution.”). 
 50. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf (reaffirming 
flexibility of TRIPS member states in circumventing patent rights for better access to essential 
medicines). 
 51. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 37, at 63, 67. 
 52. See id. at 63–64. 
 53. Helfer, supra note 31, at 19, 22. 
 54. See id. at 23–24.  
 55. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, pmbl. (“[T]he proliferation of counterfeit and 
pirated goods as well as the proliferation of services that distribute infringing material, 
  
206 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:197 
rhetoric, including allegations that piracy “provides a source of revenue 
for organized crime and otherwise poses risk to the public.”56 ACTA’s 
very name (“Anti-Counterfeiting . . . ”) evokes trademark law, the 
primary purpose of which is to protect the public, even though 
trademark is only one of the fields of IP implicated by the agreement.57 
On its own, this rhetorical shift is not overly disconcerting. The 
procedural posture of ACTA, however, is rife with troubling 
differentiations from the agreements preceding it. While TRIPS was 
openly negotiated, ACTA was drafted almost entirely behind closed 
doors with select stakeholders.58 TRIPS brought its debate to a known 
entity (the WTO), whereas ACTA seeks to take development and 
enforcement matters into its own hands.59 Finally, while WIPO has 
maintained a modicum of civility with the WTO,60 WIPO’s Director 
General has not minced words on what a “bad development” ACTA’s 
implementation would be for the current multilateral system.61 
II.  THE INCEPTION, EVOLUTION, AND OBFUSCATION OF ACTA 
 To better understand the concerns stemming from ACTA, the 
background of the agreement must be examined. ACTA was primarily 
conceived in 2006 by the United States and Japan “to bring together 
those countries, both developed and developing, that are interested in 
fighting counterfeiting and piracy, and to negotiate an agreement that 
enhances international cooperation and contains effective international 
standards for enforcing intellectual property rights.”62 Japan previously 
floated the idea of a new IP enforcement treaty at the Global Congress 
on Combating Counterfeiting (GCCC), and the Congress seized upon it 
in the 2005 Lyon Declaration and its 2006 follow-up.63 The number of 
                                                                                                                                         
undermines legitimate trade and the sustainable development of the world economy, causes 
significant financial losses for right holders and for legitimate businesses . . . ”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See infra Part III. 
 58. See infra Part II. 
 59. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, ch. 5. 
 60. See WTO-WIPO Cooperation Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 22,  
1995), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtowip_e.htm. 
 61. Catherine Saez, ACTA a Sign Of Weakness in Multilateral System, WIPO Head Says,  
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ip- 
watch.org/weblog/2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multilateral-system- 
wipo-head-says. 
    62. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement - Summary of Key Elements Under              
Discussion, FOREIGN AFF. & INT’L TRADE CANADA, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/fo/key-summary-resume-cle.aspx?lang=en (last updated July 
18, 2011) [hereinafter ACTA Summary]. 
 63. SECOND GLOBAL CONGRESS ON COMBATING COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY, THE  
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countries involved in the proceedings slowly increased, with Canada, 
the European Union (EU), and Switzerland joining preliminary talks 
throughout 2006 and 2007.64 Official negotiations over ACTA began in 
June of 2008, attaching Australia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, 
South Korea and Singapore as well.65 According to reports, the October 
2010 Tokyo round of negotiations brought the participating countries to 
“agreement in principle.”66 One last round of talks (described as a “legal 
scrub”) took place in Sydney, Australia in early 2011.67 
Under its provisions, ACTA would establish a new international 
legal framework with its own governing body, eschewing existing 
international institutions such as WIPO and the WTO.68 While the 
European Commission has stated that ACTA “will be consistent with 
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and will respect the Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health,”69 others have claimed that it will likely be construed 
to go far beyond TRIPS,70 with its “ultimate objective” admittedly being 
to coerce large emerging economies, “where IPR enforcement could be 
improved, such as China, Russia or Brazil, . . . [to] sign up to the global 
pact.”71 
 The final consolidated text of ACTA contains a total of six 
chapters, themselves containing a total of 45 articles.72 Chapter I covers 
initial provisions and definitions,73 integrating portions of TRIPS by 
reference.74 Chapter II provides the basic legal framework to be 
followed by the signatories, itself split into four subsections, the four 
subsections preceded by a preamble of general obligations:75  Section 1 
                                                                                                                                         
LYON DECLARATION 1, 4, (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter LYON DECLARATION], available at 
http://www.ccapcongress.net/archives/Lyon/files/OutcomesStatement20051115.pdf. 
 64. ACTA Summary, supra note 62. 
 65. EU, US and Others Hold Geneva Talks on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,  
EUR. COMMISSION (Jun. 5, 2008), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/june/tradoc_139086
.pdf.  
 66. Elaine Lies et al., Countries Reach Tentative Anti-Counterfeiting Pact, REUTERS, Oct. 2, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/02/us-trade-counterfeiting-
idUSTRE6910AO20101002. 
 67. IP POL’Y COMMITTEE BLOG (Nov. 8, 2010), http://tacd-ip.org/archives/270. 
 68. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, ch. V. 
 69. ACTA Summary, supra note 62, at 2. 
 70. Jonathan Lynn, States Clash over Anti-Counterfeiting Enforcement, REUTERS (Jun. 9,  
2010), http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49179920100609. 
 71. ACTA Fact Sheet (March 2010), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/acta-fact-sheet-march-2010 [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
 72. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, arts. 1.1–1.X. 
 73. Id. ch. I. 
 74. Id. art. 1, n.4. 
 75. Id. ch. II, art. 2.X.  
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(in which patents and trade secrets are optional) covers civil 
enforcement, including damage awards and injunctive relief;76 Section 2 
(which does not cover patents by party agreement)77 deals with border 
measures and suggests (but does not require) de minimis exceptions for 
personal affects (e.g., imported goods for personal use);78 Section 3 
covers criminal enforcement standards;79 and Section 4 covers digital 
enforcement (including anti-circumvention provisions).80  
After establishing the bulk of its substance in the first two 
chapters, ACTA moves on to more ministerial issues. Chapter III urges 
transparency, public consultation, and public awareness, but only 
insofar as it communicates the need for protecting IP and educating on 
the available methods for doing so.81 Chapter IV lays the groundwork 
for international cooperative efforts in enforcing the agreement.82 And 
while Chapters V and VI of ACTA provide the possibility for 
subsequent amendments to the agreement,83 it does so without offering 
public or judicial review of them, only extending the elective possibility 
of third-party consultation.84 
 The closed nature of ACTA’s amendment process (which, as 
previously noted, eschews public and judicial scrutiny) is consistent 
with the lack of transparency that had marked the entire negotiation 
process. The existence of the agreement was first brought to mainstream 
public attention when a 2008 discussion paper concerning preliminary 
drafting was published on the website Wikileaks.85 The website noted 
that the paper had been distributed only to pro-copyright lobbyists for 
comment, with consumer rights groups excluded from the discussion.86 
In the wake of the leak, many such groups banded together to demand 
                                                            
 76. Id. ch. II, § 1. 
 77. Id. ch. II, § 2.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. ch. II, § 3. 
 80. Id. ch. II, § 4. 
 81. Id. ch. III. 
 82. Id. ch. IV. 
 83. Id. chs. V–VI. 
 84. Id. ch. V, art. 5.5.   
 85. Wikileaks Runs ACTA Proposal, P2PNET (May 24, 2008), 
http://www.p2pnet.net/story/16026. 
 86. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, IP JUST., available at 
http://ipjustice.org/wp/campaigns/acta/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2011) (“[A] ‘Discussion Paper on a 
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intellectual property industry, but not to public interest organizations concerned with the subject 
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the negotiations be opened up to them,87 and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation filed a federal lawsuit to expedite the process.88 Both efforts 
were summarily rebuffed by the USTR, first on the grounds that such 
release could “implicate national security or expose the USTR’s 
deliberative processes,”89 then by unconvincingly claiming the 
documents were “classified in the interest of national security pursuant 
to Executive Order 12958.”90 Efforts to obtain further information 
outside the United States met similar fates:  when the Foundation for a 
Free Information Infrastructure filed a request to the EU Council to 
release documents related to the ACTA negotiations, the Council 
simply refused to do so.91 
As it became apparent that any substantive information concerning 
ACTA’s content was being held close to the drafters’ chests, voices of 
concern began to emanate from the U.S. Congress:  Senators Patrick 
Leahy and Arlen Specter sent a letter to the USTR expressing worries 
that ACTA “could limit Congress’s ability to make appropriate 
refinements to intellectual property law in the future.”92 A subsequent 
letter from Senators Bernie Sanders and Sherrod Brown, directed 
towards the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), noted 
that “ACTA involves dozens if not hundreds of substantive aspects of 
intellectual property law and its enforcement, including those that have 
                                                            
 87. Press Release, Essential Action, Secret Counterfeiting Treaty Public Must Be Made 
Public, Global Organizations Say (Sept. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Essential Action Press Release], 
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 88. U.S. Trade Office Withholds Documents on Secret IP Enforcement Treaty, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/09/17. 
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Security Information, 60 FED. REG. 19825 (Apr. 17, 1995), available at 
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the invocation of 12958 noted that the texts requested “are being widely circulated to corporate 
lobbyists in Europe, Japan, and the U.S.” See James Love, Obama Administration Rules Texts of 
New IPR Agreement Are State Secrets, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/obama-administration-rule_b_174450.html.  
 91. Ante Wessels, EU Council Refuses to Release Secret ACTA Documents, FOUND. FOR 
FREE INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, http://press.ffii.org/Press_releases/EU_Council_refuses_to_releas
e_secret_ACTA_documents (last modified Aug. 15, 2009). 
 92. Stephanie Condon, Pro-IP Senators Concerned Anti-Counterfeiting Treaty May Be Too 
Broad, CNET NEWS (Oct. 2, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10057100-38.html.  
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nothing to do with counterfeiting . . . [and] the public has a right to 
monitor and express informed views on proposals of such magnitude.”93 
Yet another letter from Senator Ron Wyden demanded that the USTR 
confirm the veracity of leaks surrounding the then-unfinished 
agreement, noting that the “objectives behind [ACTA’s] negotiations 
still remain inadequately clear to the American public.”94 
Similar reactions could be seen across the international 
community’s legislative and diplomatic bodies. The EU Parliament 
voted 663 to 13 against validating ACTA, proclaiming:  “This 
Parliament will not sit back silently while the fundamental rights of 
millions of citizens are being negotiated away behind closed doors. We 
oppose any ‘legislation laundering’ on an international level of what 
would be very difficult to get through most national legislatures or the 
European Parliament.”95 Individual countries also balked:  Brazil plainly 
described ACTA as illegitimate,96 the Mexican Senate voted 
unanimously to withdraw from its negotiations,97 and India voiced 
serious concerns on the floor of the WTO: 
While India is committed to dealing with IPR enforcement issues in 
line with its TRIPS obligations, the introduction of intrusive IPR 
enforcement rules in international trade does not represent a 
reasonable or realistic response. Agreements such as ACTA have the 
portents to completely upset the balance of rights and obligations of 
the TRIPS Agreement. They could also potentially undermine 
serious decisions taken multilaterally such as the Doha Declaration 
on Public Health in WTO and the Development Agenda in WIPO. 
An enforcement response, if required, has to emerge from a 
multilateral and transparent process, as is available in the WTO 
TRIPS Council, and should fully conform to the Objectives and 
Principles (Art 7, 8) of TRIPS agreement and the balance of rights 
and obligations enshrined in the Agreement.98 
                                                            
 93. James Love, Senators Sanders and Brown Ask White House to Make ACTA Text Public, 
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 94. David Kravets, Senator Demands IP Treaty Details, THREAT LEVEL (Jan. 7, 2010), 
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India’s multi-pronged analysis of ACTA’s disruptive potential 
warrants particular attention, especially its mention of the Doha 
Declaration on Public Health, as the latter is highly instructive of the 
tunnel-vision developed nations often have when dealing with critical 
aspects of international IP. The Doha Declaration emerged from the 
WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001, proclaiming that:  
The TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members 
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while 
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that 
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health 
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.99 
The provisions therein sought to ensure that developing countries 
could circumvent certain international patent obligations by obtaining 
compulsory licenses for essential medicines,100 as well as establish 
criteria for exhaustion of IP rights concerning the same.101 In 2005, 
members of the WTO pushed to directly incorporate Doha into 
TRIPS.102 All the while, the United States opposed Doha, claiming there 
was nothing wrong with the text of TRIPS as it stood.103 Whether a 
sincere belief of its representatives at the time or not, the United States’ 
dismissive attitude during Doha now seems symptomatic of a pervasive 
disinterest in the unpleasant ramifications of stringent IP enforcement.  
 It took the pressures of the international community to pass Doha, 
much as it took public outcry and an unauthorized Wikileaks release to 
bring ACTA to public light,104 and those in charge of ACTA have taken 
on a similarly blasé attitude concerning agreement’s ability to upset 
existing legal regimes and principles. Though ACTA negotiators 
repeatedly insisted that passage of the agreement would not require 
changes to domestic law in particular territories, commentators singled 
                                                            
 99. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at 
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 103. Ian F. Fergusson, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development 
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out many areas of apparent conflict that called into question the honesty 
of that proclamation.105  
In the United States, the typical response to such skepticism 
proved to be an oblique “stay the course” mantra; for example, three 
weeks after Senators Sanders and Brown asked USPTO Director David 
Kappos to address specific concerns concerning the legality of ACTA’s 
provisions, Kappos responded with a five-sentence letter that did 
anything but.106 James Love put it tersely:  
The November 12, 2010 Kappos letter was described by Senator 
Sanders’ office as “a non-response,” and that’s polite. Senators 
Sanders and Brown asked Kappos to compare the text in ACTA, 
highlighting in particular the articles on damages, injunctions, other 
remedies and border measures, against U.S. law, including but not 
limited to one supreme court decision and several selected statutes in 
the area of patents, copyrights and trademarks. The Kappos response 
contained no analysis, no cites to U.S. law, no cites to the ACTA 
text; only a thank you and a promise that “our USPTO issue experts 
will continue to work with USTR as they finalize the results 
achieved in Tokyo.”107 
 While the European response to ACTA criticism proved more 
open (in that actual responses were offered),108 it made the drawbacks of 
keeping ACTA under lock and key even more apparent. EU 
Commissioner Karel De Gucht, for example, had been the principal 
authority promoting ACTA within the EU Parliament, making his 
statements a key source of information for both the members of 
parliament and the public at large to understand the ramifications of the 
treaty.109 As a result, when he claimed that ACTA “does not oblige any 
of its signatories to create new, substantive rights or to change existing 
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ones,”110 it was reasonable to believe (as German MEP Daniel Caspary 
did) that ACTA would be fully compliant with existing EU law.111 De 
Gucht was later forced to admit, however, that the truth is far more 
nuanced:  “[Where] there is no EU acquis,112 i.e. penal enforcement, it is 
possible that some Member States may need to adapt domestic 
legislation to comply with commitments they have undertaken in the 
negotiation of the ACTA section on penal enforcement.”113 Given that 
criminal liability for infringement was one of the most contentious 
issues underlying ACTA’s negotiations,114 this sort of hair-splitting 
seemed disingenuous at best, highlighting the danger of designating the 
words of a handful of ACTA spokespeople as “everything non-
negotiators needed to know” between drafting rounds.  
Furthermore, the duality of ACTA’s public face (clandestine 
negotiations followed by jarring public revelations) proved to be one of 
its greatest weaknesses.115 As working drafts of the agreement regularly 
leaked over the Internet, handlers such as De Gucht became mere 
apologists for both its content and drafting methodologies, whereas if 
the negotiations had been open to the public to begin with, substance 
would have been the focus, with greater goodwill tempering the 
discussions. Instead, however, negotiators doubled down on their 
tactics, claiming the agreement had to be kept under lock and key as a 
matter of principle.116 Yet diplomatic cables subsequently revealed that 
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“[t]he level of confidentiality in these ACTA negotiations has been set 
at a higher level than is customary for non-security agreements . . . it is 
impossible for member states to conduct necessary consultations with 
IPR stakeholders and legislatures under this level of confidentiality.”117 
This revelation raised a salient question:  if the opaque drafting process 
of ACTA was both unusual and counterproductive (according to its own 
negotiating members), why was it so insistently kept in place? 
III.  THE SCHISM BETWEEN “COUNTERFEITING” AND  
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 
 The explanation to the preceding question is two-fold, requiring 
discussion of both the nature of intellectual property itself and the 
nature of legislation in general. The latter issue is effectively 
summarized by Kimberlee Weatherall of The Beirne School of Law:  
Laws, like objects in physics, have a tendency to remain where they 
are and take the application of ‘force’ to bring about change. Legal 
change disrupts existing industry practice and once the prospect of 
copyright or patent reform is raised it is difficult to confine the issues 
that become ‘open for debate.’118  
Thus, each time IP maximalists call for greater levels of protection 
through legislative channels, they are sure to be met by IP reformists 
seeking to match or exceed their force—the drafting of the 1996 WIPO 
treaties being a perfect example of this negation in practice.119 The 
problem is that (to borrow phrasing from Susan K. Sell), IP maximalists 
will often “assert their rights without recognizing their obligations”120 by 
seeking to ratchet up protection of their interests without opening the 
Pandora’s Box of wholesale debate, utilizing what economic and legal 
pundit Michael Masnick describes as “a geopolitical game of leapfrog”: 
The [IP] industry gets its diplomats to claim that a treaty is needed to 
‘harmonize’ international laws on things like copyright, because one 
country has less stringent laws than another. Of course, the treaty 
always focuses on bringing the less stringent rules up to the level of 
the nation with the more stringent rules. Then, the industry works on 
                                                                                                                                         
accepted practice during trade negotiations among sovereign states to not share negotiating texts 
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 118. Kimberlee Weatherall, ACTA as a New Kind of International IP Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. 
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getting local laws made stronger again . . . and then claims that the 
international partners all have to boost the levels of protection again 
to ‘harmonize’ things. What happens is you get an escalating system 
where the laws keep getting more stringent as each side tries to 
‘catch up’ with the other, while leapfrogging them each time they do. 
This gets even worse, because whenever people talk of reducing 
intellectual property protection, the same groups that lobbied for 
stronger intellectual property laws then start saying that we could 
never do that because it would violate these all important 
international treaties . . . 121 
Masnick’s lay summary of what is essentially the ratchet theory 
illustrates two distinct advantages seized by maximalists:  it allows 
them to reframe the issue of IP harmonization to treat it as an almost 
exclusively economic issue, then bind legislatures to increasingly high 
predicate levels of harmonization, robbing them of their supervisory 
functions. By shifting harmonization efforts from optional treaties like 
the Paris and Berne Conventions to mandatory implementations such as 
TRIPS, the construct itself becomes one of stringency rather than 
respect for different cultures and property rights regimes. IP is moved 
further away from nuance and closer to literality (i.e. treatment as actual 
property). By helping to facilitate this shift, maximalists encourage 
conflation of physical and intellectual property, equating copyright 
infringement with physical counterfeiting, and thus birth the rhetorical 
argument for extending harmonization of trademark protection (the 
logical focus of ACTA)122 to cover copyrights and patents as well. 
The elephant in the room concerning the aforementioned rhetoric 
is, of course, that IP is a purely legal construct. The fundamental 
purpose of property rights is to better manage the allocation of scarce 
resources; those who have it may buy, sell, and exchange it as they 
please, guided by principles of market efficiency.123 Intellectual 
property, however, is an infinite resource, incapable of exhaustion—
hence why copyrights and patents are protected in the United States by 
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the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause,124 while only trademarks 
are protected under the Commerce Clause.125 This split between 
trademark law and the rest of IP law is critical to understanding the 
proper role of ACTA, and why its current form betrays its potential. 
While no IP is capable of exhaustion, trademarks are capable of 
inefficient allocation, and thus retain a modicum of similarity to actual 
property.126 In this regard, consumers can and should be protected from 
unscrupulous purveyors of counterfeit products when they market their 
wares as those of another. If the purpose of ACTA is to prevent 
counterfeiting by inferior producers, trademark law has a place within 
it. However, no similar harm is caused to consumers when they 
purchase pirated DVDs or medicines manufactured in violation of a 
patent. Absent deception as to the origin of a product, the only 
perceptible harm caused, if any, is to the holders of the copyright or 
patent. Once this premise is accepted, ACTA is no longer a security 
agreement, but a trade agreement in security’s clothing.  
It is clear that copyrights and patents do not meet the same 
criterion as trademarks when explaining what motivates the government 
to grant exclusive controls over them to individuals. The purpose of 
most IP, as spelled out in the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, is “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts”127—in other words, IP rights are provided as an incentive to create 
new works. The method of incentive is “by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries”128—an artificial monopoly on what is 
otherwise capable of being infinitely reproduced. It is especially 
important to take note of the particular locution of the Constitution:  the 
goal of the Intellectual Property Clause is to “promote the Progress.”129 
The natural question is:  who benefits from progress? And the natural 
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answer is the citizenry.130 Were the chief goal to benefit the creators of 
IP, the clause would read along the lines of “to secure the Livelihood of 
Authors and Inventors.” Instead, the goal of the clause’s grant is the 
progress made, while the incentive (a temporary grant of artificial 
monopolization) is merely a means to facilitate that progress.131 
 Even in this balance of rights and incentives, however, the history 
of American jurisprudence has shown that a complete monopoly on the 
works produced under the Intellectual Property Clause is intolerable.132 
Products of the mind are subject to far greater philosophical and 
utilitarian concerns than real property when it comes to abuse. This is 
why so many protections are built into IP law for its various shades of 
grey—what real property sees as trespass to chattels, intellectual 
property may call fair use. This balancing act of rights and obligations, 
integral to understanding what drives principled protection of IP, is at 
the core of what ACTA threatens in the eyes of IP reformists. TRIPS 
has already demonstrated how much easier it is to lock down IP’s 
shades of grey when they are framed as impediments rather than safety 
valves.133 ACTA, with its heated rhetoric on the threats posed by piracy 
to both trade and security, seems well-poised to leapfrog it. 
For the past twenty years, protection of IP has been in a perpetual 
upward spiral, with slivers of anti-protection carved out to appease non-
rights holders along the way.134 The outpouring of criticism concerning 
ACTA (what Weatherall has characterized as a “collective, even ‘open 
source’ analysis”135 by academics, pundits, and concerned citizens) is 
evidence of widespread dissatisfaction with not only the character of the 
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global ratchet, but the direction in which it has been taking IP as a 
whole. Maximalists may claim this perception is the result of an echo 
chamber effect, amplifying what is, in reality, simply the cacophonous 
drone of a handful of academics, likely infringers, and politicians 
pandering to both. If true, the same maximalists should be pushing for 
ACTA to go through a legislative vote as with any other IP treaty, 
allowing Congress to vet the text and put faces and careers to its 
approval or rejection. After all, if the voices of dissent are truly a 
minority, then obtaining majority passage after a debate should not be a 
difficult task. Were ACTA to be subjected to a legislative diagnosis, 
however, maximalists would be deprived of their second major 
advantage in utilizing the harmonization construct through ACTA (as 
alluded to by Masnick):  the ability to not only bypass the legislative 
branch entirely, but permanently tie its hands on various issues by 
unilaterally installing new glass floors on IP protection.136 This is one of 
the most onerous possible outcomes of ACTA’s passage, and the 
language allowing it to occur is already in place.137 
IV.  SECONDARY LIABILITY AND THE HARMONIZATION GLASS FLOOR 
 In October of 2010, a group of over seventy-five prominent law 
professors released an open letter to President Obama, urging him to 
“halt [his administration’s] public endorsement of ACTA and subject 
the text to a meaningful participation process that can influence the 
shape of the agreement going forward.”138 The letter warned that ACTA 
“would establish new intellectual property rules and norms without 
systematic inquiry into effects of such development on economic and 
technical innovation in the United States or abroad. These norms 
[would] affect virtually every American and should be the subject of 
wide public debate.”139 More worrisome, the letter noted, was the 
prospect that ACTA could unconstitutionally usurp congressional 
authority: 
The President may only make sole executive agreements that are 
within his independent constitutional authority. The President has no 
independent constitutional authority over intellectual property or 
communications policy, the core subjects of ACTA. To the contrary, 
the Constitution gives primary authority over these matters to 
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Congress, which is charged with making laws that regulate foreign 
commerce and intellectual property.140 
It is for this very reason that members of Congress have voiced 
serious concern with the ACTA drafting protocols,141 and is likely why 
maximalists have supported those same protocols. The letter to Obama 
critically notes that “[a]cademics and other neutral intellectual property 
experts have not had time to sufficiently analyze the current text and are 
unlikely to do so as long as there is no open public forum to submit such 
analysis in a meaningful process.”142 In truth, many of ACTA’s 
provisions are likely there precisely because the merits have been 
contested in the past, and to the marked dissatisfaction of ACTA’s 
primary beneficiaries. 
Secondary liability, for example, is one of the most hotly debated 
subjects in modern copyright law.143 Sometimes referred to as indirect, 
contributory, or vicarious liability, it arises when a party is found to 
have materially contributed to, facilitated, induced, or is otherwise 
responsible for directly infringing acts carried out by another party.144 
The basis for it in the United States stems from the common law of 
agency145 and is entirely case-driven, as the Copyright Act contains no 
explicit provision establishing liability for acts committed by a party 
other than the direct infringer.146 One of the more recent developments 
of the doctrine occurred in the 2005 case of MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., where the United States Supreme Court held a popular 
file sharing service that allowed users to trade copyrighted music files 
was secondarily liable for inducing infringement of those songs from 
said users: 
[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of 
infringement by third parties.147 
                                                            
 140. Id. (internal citations omitted) 
 141. See supra Part II. 
 142. PIJIP Letter, supra note 3, at 3.  
 143. See, e.g., Matthew Helton, Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement: BitTorrent 
as a Vehicle for Establishing a New Copyright Definition for Staple Articles of Commerce, 40 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (2006–07). 
 144. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 
(2003). 
 145. See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1927). 
 146. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984). The 
Supreme Court has itself noted, “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for 
infringement committed by another.”  
 147. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). 
  
220 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:197 
At the same time that Grokster was being considered, a bill 
proposing a statutory amendment similar to the Supreme Court’s 
holding was introduced to Congress as “The Inducing Infringement of 
Copyrights Act” (INDUCE).148 The bill sought to amend federal 
copyright law to state:  “Whoever intentionally induces any violation 
[of copyright] shall be liable as an infringer.”149 The bill went on to 
define “intentionally induces” as referring to anyone who “intentionally 
aids, abets, induces, or procures, and intent may be shown by acts from 
which a reasonable person would find intent to induce infringement 
based upon all relevant information about such acts then reasonably 
available to the actor, including whether the activity relies on 
infringement for its commercial viability.”150 
While the Grokster ruling and the INDUCE language are quite 
similar, one glaring difference between the two is that INDUCE sought 
to extend secondary liability to not only a party who “induces” 
infringement, but who “aids” or “abets” infringement as well.151 This is 
doctrinally problematic for a number of policy reasons:  As law 
professor Michael Carrier explains, aiding and abetting is a not a civil 
standard, but a criminal one,  
used to punish those who assisted in the crime. The getaway driver. 
The fraudulent check presenter. The cocaine distributor. In the 
criminal law arena, such liability reaches broadly to deter true 
criminal conduct. In the context of secondary copyright liability, in 
contrast, such a standard is not appropriate. Not when copyright is 
subject to competing public policies. Not when technologies could 
be held criminally liable for allowing search, performance, or 
retrieval. Not when these monumentally significant issues—which 
would dramatically expand U.S. liability—were never even 
debated.152  
Perhaps it is for this very reason that INDUCE was never passed 
by Congress153—they may have understood the prescience of allowing 
the doctrine of vicarious liability in copyright law to be slowly shaped 
and applied by the courts in response to a changing world, rather than 
locking it into legislation in its most nascent form. Professor Carrier’s 
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words would certainly have been persuasive in the debate over 
INDUCE’s passage, but alas, he did not write them in reference to 
INDUCE; he was writing about ACTA. 
 Article 23.4 of ACTA requires signatory nations to “ensure that 
criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available,”154 applying it to 
“willful” infringement on a “commercial scale” (which is defined as 
“commercial activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage”).155 The totality of this article allows for a finding of 
secondary liability if an entity “aids or abets” activity indicative of 
“indirect” commercial advantage, folding in terminology that ACTA 
representatives insisted would not be part of the agreement’s final 
draft.156 Due to the nebulous definitions within ACTA and the shifting 
liabilities involved, third party intermediaries such as internet service 
providers may face a simple choice under the agreement:  risk 
prosecution for inadvertently “aiding or abetting” infringers, remove 
their services from the market, or institute draconian procedures to 
ensure that the first option can never come to manifest. The United 
States’ preferred route was made clear by language formerly contained 
in Section 3 of ACTA, which intimated that the only surefire way for a 
service provider to receive “safe harbor” protections from potential 
secondary liability would be by terminating the service of repeat 
infringers.157 It should be noted that this provision surfaced after the 
USTR claimed that the United States would not be pursuing a “three 
strikes” approach to safe harbor protection, which “termination of 
repeat infringers” is in all but strict numerics.158  
Congress has good reason to be worried about a purported 
executive agreement that skirts their approval while mandating legal 
standards they themselves have rejected in legislative form (i.e., 
INDUCE), especially when the agreement’s subject matter is supposed 
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to be within their exclusive purview.159 Even if ACTA is fully compliant 
with existing U.S. law (the questionable go-to justification for treating it 
as an executive agreement at all),160 it still abrogates Congress’s 
authority on IP issues by only allowing them to push forth stronger 
protections to avoid placing the United States in violation of its new 
international obligations.161 This is a serious problem with ratcheting up 
harmonization efforts within contentious pockets of law—signatory 
nations may find themselves unable to properly address dynamic legal 
issues that arguably call for laxer restrictions or new systems entirely. 
V.  INFIGHTING BEHIND ACTA 
The preceding analysis is not something that has been lost on the 
negotiating parties of ACTA—diplomatic cables from 2009 reveal 
awareness that “the secrecy around the negotiations has led to that [sic] 
the legitimacy of the whole process being questioned.”162 Outside the 
negotiation rounds, the agreement has been repeatedly referred to by 
countries within the WTO as a “TRIPS-plus” measure, with China and 
Brazil reportedly worried that its passage would “constrain flexibilities 
and undermine the balance of rights in the TRIPS Agreement.”163 The 
USTR has danced around the issue by insisting that the plain language 
of ACTA can be ignored or softened under the flexibility of Article 
1.2.1, which advises that “[e]ach Party shall be free to determine the 
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement 
within its own legal system and practice.”164 This claim is problematic 
in two respects:  First, it ignores the fact that Article 1.1 of TRIPS has 
the same boilerplate language, and countries have been found liable 
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through the WTO dispute resolution process for failing their 
responsibilities under TRIPS even after invoking 1.1 as an affirmative 
defense.165  Second, if ACTA were truly so malleable, then it stands to 
reason that its provisional history would not be so tumultuous, which 
the record clearly establishes it was. 
According to Weatherall, the story of ACTA has essentially been a 
test case for the global ratchet theory of IP protection itself.166  
Weatherall’s analysis begins with the premise that ACTA is essentially 
a “TRIPS-plus agreement,”167 which, based on the ratchet theory, should 
be lubricated by the many free-trade agreements between the involved 
countries that have preceded it.168 Speaking to her own jurisdiction of 
Australia, she states that “the AU.S.FTA bilateral agreement has been a 
‘stepping stone’ in that it removed Australia as a potential opponent to 
certain provisions” of ACTA,169 particularly those affecting copyright 
law.170 The United States has been noted as a prolific negotiator of Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) in recent years, having struck them with over 
a dozen countries in the run-up to ACTA's negotiations171 in order to 
raise their overall levels of IP protection.172 Yet despite this predicate 
level of harmonization, many provisions of ACTA still required 
extensive scaling back during the negotiation rounds: 
The European Union, Japan and New Zealand—parties not already 
bound by U.S. FTAs—all expressed doubt about the inclusion of 
access controls and criminal penalties. The text publicly released in 
April 2010 clearly demonstrates that these differences continued in 
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the Wellington round of negotiations, with square brackets 
separating out any reference to access controls or criminal penalties. 
The leaked text dated July 2010—after the round in Luzern, 
Switzerland in June-July 2010—shows a further shift away from the 
U.S.’s preferred model to a form of language that can accommodate 
a range of anti-circumvention laws.173 
Amongst many other tweaks, the reference to criminal penalties 
eventually disappeared from the text altogether, and language indicating 
the overall scope of the laws was reduced.174 Based on these 
concessions, Weatherall concludes that “we are not seeing 
multilateralisation of the FTA standards nor are they the ‘starting point’ 
from which standards can only go up. In fact, at all times the standards 
embodied in the ACTA draft have been considerably weaker than we 
have seen in the U.S. FTAs or in U.S. or EU internal rules.”175 
Essentially, while ACTA began with a far more ambitious agenda, the 
ratchet appeared to collapse under its own weight. 
 While the preceding analysis may be touted as demonstrative of a 
flaw in the ratchet theory, it may also be seen as a last gasp from the 
core of the harmonization construct. The current crop of proposals 
comprising ACTA is a patchwork of watered down provisions, 
principally whatever was left after all proposals were bled and defanged 
to satisfaction. On the one hand, this is a mixed victory for IP reformists 
(for whatever consolation they may take from “two steps ratcheted, one 
step scaled back”)—on the other hand, it is an abysmal failure to bring 
the negotiating countries to a meaningful consensus on issues of IP 
enforcement. It is reminiscent of the recent Information Society 
Directive negotiated within Europe, which Weatherall notes “has not 
led to good outcomes for user or, arguably, right holder interests”—
rather, it has simply led to Member States interpreting the Directive 
according to their own traditions, “leading to a mosaic of different rules 
across Europe.”176 In short, it has been antithetical to harmonization. 
Similarly, the end result of ACTA’s negotiations has been a 
document rife with nebulous language, as confirmed by the 
Congressional Research Service (whose findings were initially 
suppressed by the USTR,177 perhaps due to the fact that they arguably 
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contradicted assurances that ACTA would not require changes to 
domestic law).178 According to the report, “[d]epending on how broadly 
or narrowly several passages from the ACTA draft text are interpreted, 
it appears that certain provisions of federal intellectual property law 
could be regarded as inconsistent with ACTA.”179 Even more troubling 
is the fact that despite the existence of caveat clauses that allow 
signatories to be flexible in their implementations of the agreement, 
“Members of Congress might be reluctant to consider legislative 
approaches that would alter federal law in a manner that might make the 
United States in default of its ACTA obligations.”180 This allows ACTA 
to potentially cripple legislative oversight of IP while also providing 
little assurance that the agreement would result in any semblance of 
uniform application; success in the latter realm will depend on both the 
ACTA Committee’s ability to effectively sanction its members and 
members’ ability to coerce non-members to join the agreement. 
VI.  ACTA’S MEMBERSHIP AND “HARMONIZING WITHOUT A CARROT” 
While early literature released by negotiating parties emphasized 
hopes that developing countries would eventually join ACTA,181 leaked 
diplomatic cables clarified that ACTA was meant to be imposed on 
developing countries after setting “high-standards . . . among a select 
group of like-minded countries.”182 Furthermore, the goal of ACTA was 
“not to negotiate the different interests of [those] like-minded 
countries,”183 but to “solve” the problems of developing countries184 
while not actually having them at the negotiating table. As a 
consequence, ACTA reflects few of the most critical internal concerns 
of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRIC countries), but rather 
those of developed nations regarding those countries’ allegedly weak IP 
regimes. The question then becomes how to entice such countries to 
“aspire” to join such an asymmetrical and non-beneficial agreement.  
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As previously noted, ACTA’s provisions go far beyond what is 
required by TRIPS185 while not embodying its balancing mechanisms.186 
Developing countries have already expressed serious concerns with the 
agreement’s procedural posture187 and will likely be even less receptive 
to its substantive protectionism, which may impact their access to 
knowledge, technology, and other valuable resources.188 For many such 
countries, protecting IP simply is not a major priority when its primary 
beneficiaries are a handful of industries in developed nations.189 TRIPS 
was able to leverage IP protection onto developing nations by “dangling 
a carrot” in front of them, so to speak—access to the WTO.190 The many 
bilateral FTAs that the United States forged with other countries, while 
setting precedent for IP ratcheting, presumably benefitted the domestic 
economies of those countries as well. ACTA, meanwhile, seems to be 
an agreement without a carrot. It simply exhorts nations to join the 
collective and alter their domestic legislation to the benefit of IP right 
holders and the detriment of many others. 
There is always the possibility that the carrot, instead of being fed 
to developing nations, will be used as a bludgeoning tool. The United 
States has proven in the past that it is not beyond utilizing legislative 
coercion to grease the wheels of trade negotiations,191 and more 
frequently employs methods of  “soft” coercion (such as its Special 301 
Report)192 to call for greater IP enforcement in various nations (although 
some have lambasted these methods as “petty” and “lacking reliable and 
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objective analysis”).193 The private sector has weighed in as well:  A 
consortium of entertainment trade groups have directly lobbied the 
European Parliament to ratify ACTA as well, by urging that a delay in 
doing so would “weaken the position of the EU vis-à-vis its 
international trading partners.”194 Other groups have taken a less 
threatening tone:  the EU Council has championed ACTA as a 
“balanced agreement” that “fully respects the rights of citizens and the 
concerns of important stakeholders such as consumers, internet 
providers and partners in developing countries.”195 In doing so, the 
Council skirts concerns that accession would circumvent parliamentary 
procedures for regulating criminal enforcement measures.196 The 
European Commission has largely duplicated these positions, calling for 
speedy ratification and reaffirming an allegedly unsullied acquis.197  
Despite their best efforts, however, the ACTA lobby was unable to 
make a perceptible dent in converting many non-believers; even 
Mexico, whose negotiators stressed “their willingness to join 
the . . . negotiations and push-back against Brazilian efforts to 
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undermine IPR in international health organizations,”198 ultimately saw 
its Senate come out against the agreement.199 A report commissioned by 
members of the EU Parliament warned of potentially severe negative 
impacts on public health as a result of ACTA’s patent provisions,200 
simultaneously slamming the ACTA negotiators for having ignored 
nine specific Parliamentary demands for transparency.201 Furthermore, 
questions regarding the legality of the agreement continue to percolate 
in the U.S. Congress202 and the EU203, with the American Society for 
International Law warning that ACTA’s intent to avoid the need for 
legislative ratification whenever possible “has consequences not only 
for intellectual property law, but for any area in which an international 
agreement may be concluded—which is to say, nearly any area of 
law.”204  
Clearly, the same concerns that plagued ACTA since its first draft 
have not dissipated, and now that the dust has settled on the negotiation 
rounds, there is no more room for hope that its flaws will ultimately end 
up on the cutting room floor. By October of 2011, eight countries 
officially acceded to ACTA,205 with notable holdouts from the initial 
signing ceremony including the EU, Mexico, and Switzerland.206 While 
initially entertained as merely indicative of a vetting period, it also gave 
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those countries the ability to observe some telling statements from 
ACTA’s “eager beavers:”  Canada (whose Industry Minister said ACTA 
will be “subservient” to domestic copyright law)207 and New Zealand 
(who claimed “ACTA will not change existing standards”)208 both 
admitted that they would have to change their domestic laws to be in 
compliance with the agreement.209  Given Knowledge Ecology 
International’s analysis demonstrating that the United States is also not 
in compliance with ACTA in at least two key areas (injunctions and 
damages),210 one can assume its unapologetic mea culpa is coming 
shortly. 
VII. LOOKING BEYOND ACTA AND BACK AGAIN 
Despite the miasma of concern surrounding ACTA, IP maximalists 
have continued to push forward. Soon after finalizing ACTA, the USTR 
unveiled details of a new Asia-Pacific trade agreement known as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),211 which Public Knowledge has 
described as “ACTA the Sequel.”212 Even before its text had been 
drafted, right holders already began to push for it to leapfrog ACTA in 
terms of IP protection,213 and the USTR has stated that its IP chapter is 
intended to “harmonize IPR obligations strictly upwards.”214 
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Furthermore, the negotiations of the TPP “[would] not involve any 
commitments to sharing the text with the general public, even after it 
has been given to all member countries in the negotiation and to 
hundreds of corporate insiders on the USTR advisory board system.”215 
In fact, all TPP-related documents but the final consolidated text will be 
kept secret for four years after the agreement comes into force or the 
negotiations collapse.216 There are few conclusions to reach in light of 
this information other than that the United States has largely shrugged 
off the criticism concerning ACTA’s handling, as it seeks to leapfrog its 
questionable conduct and content with its new trade agreement.217 
Elsewhere in the ratchet, however, cracks are forming. In 2011, 
U.S. Representative Lamar Smith and U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy 
introduced the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Preventing Real 
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act (PROTECT IP, or PIPA) to the House and Senate, 
respectively.218 The bills were offered up with the stated goal of giving 
both the U.S. government and private copyright holders new tools to 
attack so-called "rogue websites dedicated to the sale of infringing or 
counterfeit goods"219—essentially domestic analogues to ACTA. The 
two bills received widespread criticism from technology experts,220 
legal scholars,221 venture capitalists,222 and many others for their overly 
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broad language223 and potential chilling effects on both commerce224 
and free speech.225 The response from the bills' advocates was largely 
dismissive, refusing to directly address the specific areas of concern 
brought to their attention226 and (much as was seen with ACTA) treating 
the protests as the actions of a vocal minority.227 Seeing no reason to 
slow down, SOPA and PIPA's sponsors pushed forth in the legislative 
process despite widespread pleas not to do so.228 
Finally, IP maximalists had overplayed their hand. Grassroots 
protest efforts swelled, with major Internet players and their users 
banding together for a trickle-up coordinated strike against what they 
perceived as an attempt to censor the Internet itself.229 On January 18, 
2012, hundreds of websites went "dark" to demonstrate the effect that 
SOPA and PIPA would have on not just "rogue websites," but 
legitimate web-based companies.230 The protests dominated news 
cycles,231 edifying millions on the dangers of the bills in question232 and 
resulting in a deluge of communiqués to elected officials in Washington 
D.C..233 The results were palpable:  according to ProPublica, the shift in 
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stated positions on SOPA and PIPA by members of Congress had gone 
overnight from 80 for and 31 against to 65 for and 101 against,234 and 
all then-four Republican candidates for the 2012 Presidential Election 
had come out against the bills.235 Within two days of the protests, both 
SOPA and PIPA were listed as indefinitely postponed—in a word, 
dead.236 
While there is every chance that SOPA and PIPA will be revived 
in the future and subjected to a paring-down process similar to ACTA, 
IP maximalists must now contend not only with the classic entrenched 
opposition to their efforts (academics and citizens' rights activists), but 
also with a galvanized public that has finally awoken to the perceived 
overreaches of industry lobbying—including ACTA.237 Less than a 
month after the SOPA protests, tens of thousands of EU citizens took to 
the streets against ACTA (which had been signed by the EU in January 
of 2012238), sending a shockwave through the region that resulted in 
multiple member countries withdrawing their support for the 
agreement.239 Most striking were the statements made by Lithuanian 
Justice Minister Remigijus Simasius, who expressed great skepticism 
not only of ACTA, but the entire state of play in current IP law: 
[O]ur life is more and more dependent on R&D, new inventions, 
creativity. Existing IP protection system, however, is more about 
protecting the IP protection industry than a protection of inventors 
and authors. Current debate worldwide is a clear sign that we have to 
re-evaluate the existing IP rights system.240 
Responding to this backlash, Karel De Gucht agreed to refer ACTA to 
the European Court of Justice in order to determine whether or not the 
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agreement is compatible with "fundamental EU rights and freedoms."241 
Unfortunately for ACTA, the prospect of a judicial affirmation was not 
enough to stem the tide of public mistrust that had been triggered; even 
the EU Rapporteur on ACTA, David Martin, declined to wait for the 
ECJ to chime in before announcing that he would recommend the 
European Parliament reject the treaty,242 and EU Commissioner Neelie 
Kroes plainly stated that “[w]e are now likely to be in a world without 
SOPA and without ACTA.”243 In July of 2012, the European Parliament 
made good on Kroes’ prediction by flatly rejecting ACTA, 478 votes to 
39: 
The majority in the European Parliament is of the opinion that 
ACTA is a wrong solution, a sentiment shared by millions of 
citizens. The majority in the European Parliament is of the opinion 
that ACTA is too vague, leaving the room for abuses and raising 
concern about its impact on consumers' privacy and civil liberties, on 
innovation and the free flow of information.244 
Martin, who was charged with administering the vote, speculated 
that its defeat was likely to be the global death knell for the treaty 
(given that just the week prior, Australia had been vocally 
contemplating withdrawal from ACTA).245 Critics of the treaty noted 
that this combination of events could very well leave the agreement 
with a dearth of signatory nations able to breathe life into it (as at least 
six countries must accede for ACTA to take effect).246 
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 Clearly, a divide has begun to appear between what proponents of 
increased IP protection can craft and what they can deliver in practice. 
Traditional lobbying efforts were not able to keep SOPA viable in the 
face of massive public scrutiny, and ACTA's numerous procedural and 
substantive deficits have provided similar fuel for activist fire. Already, 
this opposition appears to be having an impact on the direction of future 
legislation:  in the wake of the EU protests, the Dutch government 
indicated a desire to move in the opposite direction of ACTA by 
providing greater exceptions to copyright law.247 It seems odd, then, that 
in the face of one massive public defeat (SOPA) and staring down the 
barrel of another (ACTA), the TPP negotiators have doubled down on 
their clandestine methods while still managing to convey the appearance 
(if not the actual presence) of impropriety.248 This suggests that, in the 
eyes of developed nations, harmonization is still an entirely trade-driven 
construct (initial leaks of the TPP's text appearing to confirm this),249 
and perhaps that all ACTA needed to stave off criticism was a few more 
rounds of small-scale FTAs to buttress the framework of a plurilateral 
agreement. There is little to no concern for public welfare, legal nuance, 
or basic comity; only industry and income. And perhaps that is why 
early indications are that, despite best maximalist efforts, the TPP is 
falling apart as well.250 
                                                                                                                                         
In theory, ACTA could still come into force between the United States and a 
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Switzerland. (But wait, the Mexican Senate has already rejected ACTA. As has 
Australia and Switzerland in practice. Oh well… a treaty between the United 
States and Morocco, then, in the unlikely event that the United States will 
actually and formally ratify it. You can see where this is going.) As described 
before on TorrentFreak, without the support of the European Union, ACTA is 
dead. Doesn’t exist. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
As WIPO Director General Francis Gurry stated back in 2010, 
ACTA is a sign of weakness in our current multilateral system of law.251 
The urge to solve legitimate questions of IP protection through jarring 
forum shifts and backroom deals may help to mitigate the usual 
protracted nature of international diplomacy and negotiation, but does 
nothing to service the goals of proper harmonization. In fact, by further 
decentralizing the administration of international IP law and 
undermining the efficacy of existing institutions, it degrades the very 
system it purports to augment. Canadian law professor Michael Geist 
made this very point while speaking before the European Parliament in 
March of 2012: 
All countries and stakeholders benefit from a well-functioning 
international intellectual property governance model led by WIPO 
and the WTO. Ratification of ACTA will undermine the authority of 
those institutions, causing immeasurable harm to the development of 
global IP norms. ACTA countries avoided WIPO due to gridlock 
concerns, but ratifying ACTA would perversely increase the 
likelihood of gridlock. For those countries participating in ACTA, 
the successful completion of the plurilateral model will only increase 
the incentives to by-pass WIPO as a forum for challenging, global 
issues. For those countries outside of ACTA, the relevance of WIPO 
will gradually diminish, as achieving consensus on their concerns 
may prove increasingly difficult.252 
Because the shifts underpinning ACTA are motivated almost 
exclusively by commercial entities’ wants, they lack any semblance of 
nuance, preferring disingenuous caveat clauses and nebulous language 
over legitimate and significant carve-outs, disenchanting both the public 
at large and developing nations in particular. While the ratchet was a 
viable (if somewhat unscrupulous) model for raising international 
standards of IP protection within the GATT, ACTA lacks both the 
procedural transparency and the substantive rewards that make 
traditional trade agreements viable. This is beyond the basic fact that in 
becoming a catch-all IP treaty, by dipping into areas of law where there 
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questioning whether any benefits they may be getting are worth the trouble of further liberalization of 
their domestic economy. And just to put the icing on the cake, it is becoming ever clearer that the 
Vietnamese, whose economy resembles that of China with large segments controlled by state owned 
companies, are going to have great difficulty in actually meeting the high standards being proposed.”). 
 251. Saez, supra note 61. 
 252. Michael Geist, Assessing ACTA: My Appearance Before the European Parliament INTA 
Workshop on ACTA (Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6350/125/.  
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is already substantial harmonization through other organizational 
efforts, and by attempting to bypass all the proper channels for 
international trade agreements, ACTA is trying to bite off more than a 
backroom executive agreement can reasonably chew. 
Given how nebulous and difficult to track ACTA has been over the 
course of its life, and because of the incredible systemic tumult that has 
been set in motion in the aftermath of the SOPA protests, it is difficult 
to ascertain what the ultimate fate of the agreement will be. At time of 
writing, it is set to remain open for signatures until May of 2013, two 
years after its final release.253 Ideally, it will be rethought for lack of 
willing signatories and the core text shifted to an organization such as 
WIPO or the WTO, where it can be converted to proposals native to that 
forum. At the very least, any further attempts to forge such agreements 
should be subject to the highest level of transparency possible, 
involving not just narrow “stakeholder consultations,” but true outreach 
to the public at large. Then and only then will its substance have 
procedural merit. There is simply no excuse for injecting yet another 
layer of bureaucracy to the international IP framework when 
bureaucracy is what has slowed down the ability of countries to adapt to 
evolving IP issues in the first place. Validating the ACTA drafters’ shell 
games can only set a bad precedent for harmonization efforts to come. 
 
                                                            
 253. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, art. 39. 
